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Fortress Re, Inc. v. Central National Insurance Co.: Application
of the Tate Test to Notice Requirements in Reinsurance
Contracts
Provisions requiring the insured to give the insurer prompt notice of the
occurrence of an insured event are common in insurance contracts.1 Because
most insurance contracts also contain clauses requiring the insurer to defend
claims brought against the insured,2 the purpose of notice provisions is to give
the insurer an opportunity to conduct a timely investigation so it may ade-
quately defend these claims.3 Most jurisdictions traditionally have taken a strict
construction approach in breach of notice provision cases, absolving the insurer
of liability under the contract if the notice requirement was not met.4 In recent
years, however, some courts have abandoned the strict construction approach in
favor of the rule that for the insurer to escape its contractual obligations not
only does the insured have to breach the notice provision, but this breach also
must prejudice the insurer by actually frustrating its ability to adequately inves-
tigate and defend the claim. 5 This Note analyzes the recent decision of Fortress
Re, Inc. v. Central National Insurance Co. 6 in which the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina applied this new "prejudice
test" to a reinsurance contract. Also, this Note discusses the unsuitability of the
prejudice test in the reinsurance context and proposes a new standard to be used
in evaluating notice requirements in reinsurance contracts.
Until 1981 North Carolina courts followed the strict construction approach
in their treatment of notice requirements in insurance policies.7 This approach
stemmed from the belief that because the terms of the insurance contract, in-
cluding the notice requirements, were agreed upon by the parties, courts should
not interfere with these terms.8 Thus the courts had only one duty in interpret-
ing insurance contracts: to ascertain and uphold the intent of the parties, always
1. See 8 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4731, at 2 (1981); 13A G. COUCH,
COUCH CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 49:2, at 227 (2d ed. 1982); Note, Great American Insur-
ance Co. v. C. G. Tate Construction Co.: Interpretation of Notice Provisions in Insurance Contracts, 61
N.C.L. REv. 167, 167 (1982).
2. 7C J. APPLEMAN, supra note 1, § 4682, at 16; 14 G. COUCH, supra note 1, § 51:35, at 438.
3. 7C J. APPLEMAN, supra note 1, § 4681, at 2; 13A G. COUCH, supra note 1, § 49:2, at 227.
4. 8 J. APPLEMAN, supra note 1, § 4732, at 10-13; 13A G. COUCH, supra note 1, § 49:50, at
278. The notice provision often is phrased in terms of a condition precedent: if notice is late, the
insurer is relieved of liability under the policy. Professors Appleman and Couch also note that even
if policies do not specify that notice is a condition precedent, courts often interpret policies as if they
did.
5. Comment, The Materiality of Prejudice to the Insurer as a Result of the Insured's Failure to
Give Timely Notice, 74 DICK. L. Rav. 260, 266-72 (1970); see, e.g., Cooper v. Government Employ-
ees Ins. Co., 51 N.J. 86, 237 A.2d 870 (1968); Brakeman v. Potomac Ins. Co., 472 Pa. 66, 371 A.2d
193 (1977); Pickering v. American Employers Ins. Co., 109 I. 143, 282 A.2d 584 (1971).
6. 595 F. Supp. 334 (E.D.N.C. 1983).
7. See, eg., Fleming v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 261 N.C. 303, 134 S.E.2d 614 (1964);
Muncie v. Travelers Ins. Co., 253 N.C. 74, 116 S.E.2d 474 (1960); Peeler v. United States Casualty
Co., 197 N.C. 286, 148 S.E. 261 (1929).
8. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 276 N.C. 348, 354, 172 S.E.2d
518, 522 (1970).
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giving effect to the clear and unambiguous meaning of the terms of the con-
tract.9 Therefore, if the contract called for notice to be given "immediately"'
10
or "as soon as practicable,"" any unreasonable delay 12 abrogated the insurer's
liability under the policy, regardless of whether the insurer's ability to defend the
claim would have been aided by timely notice.
In 1981, however, the North Carolina Supreme Court in Great American
Insurance Co. v. C. G. Tate Construction Co. 13 overruled previous cases espous-
ing the strict construction approach.14 The court adopted a three-part test for
determining whether the insurer should be relieved of its contractual obligations
because of the insured's failure to comply with notice requirements.' 5 First, a
court must determine whether notice was in fact given as soon as practicable.
16
Second, if notice was not given in a timely manner, the insured must show that
there was a good faith reason for the delay. Last, if the good faith standard is
met, the burden shifts to the insurer to show that its ability to investigate and
defend the claim was prejudiced by the delay. The court emphasized the preju-
dice component of the test, stating that the failure of an insured to give prompt
notice pursuant to an insurance contract provision does not relieve the insurer's
liability under the contract "unless the delay operates materially to prejudice the
ability of the insurer to investigate and defend."'
17
The prejudice test adopted in Tate is consistent with the modem trend
away from strict construction of notice provisions in insurance contracts.' 8 The
basis for the test lies in the courts' perception of the relationship between the
parties to an insurance contract. Courts adopting this test have noted that an
insurance contract is not usually the result of an arm's length bargaining pro-
cess, but is an adhesion contract 19 issued by an insurer on a take-it-or-leave-it
9. Id; see also Duke v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 286 N.C. 244, 247, 210 S.E.2d 187, 189 (1974)
("The intention of the parties is the controlling guide to [the] interpretation [of the insurance
contract].").
10. See, eg., Mewborn v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Co., 198 N.C. 156, 150 S.E. 887 (1929).
11. See, eg., Fleming v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 261 N.C. 303, 134 S.E.2d 614 (1964);
Muncie v. Travelers Ins. Co., 253 N.C. 74, 116 S.E.2d 474 (1960); Peeler v. United States Casualty
Co., 197 N.C. 286, 148 S.E. 261 (1929).
12. North Carolina courts have never required that immediate notice be given; rather they have
construed notice provisions to require that notice be given in a reasonable time considering the facts
and circumstances of the particular situation. See Harris v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 261 N.C.
499, 135 S.E.2d 209 (1964); Mewborn v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Co., 198 N.C. 156, 150 S.E. 887
(1929); see also Ball v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp., 206 N.C. 90, 172 S.E. 878 (1934) (delay in
giving notice due to inability to discern injury held excusable and not violative of notice require-
ment); Rhyne v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 196 N.C 717, 147 S.E. 6 (1929) (delay in giving
notice due to insured's incapacitation held excusable).
13. 303 N.C. 387, 279 S.E.2d 769 (1981).
14. Tate, 303 N.C. at 396, 279 S.E.2d at 774 ("[W]e hereby overrule the Peeler-Muncie-Flem-
ing line of cases .... ). See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
15. Id. at 399, 279 S.E.2d at 776. For a thorough discussion of the Tate decision, see Note,
supra note 1, at 168-73.
16. This initial prong of the Tate test ends the inquiry for courts adhering to the strict construc-
tion approach. See Comment, supra note 5, at 264.
17. Tate, 303 N.C. at 396, 279 S.E.2d at 774.
18. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
19. An adhesion contract is a contract in which the terms are dictated largely by one party,
rather than resulting from negotiation. See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
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basis.20 Thus, the danger exists that insurers may take advantage of their supe-
rior bargaining position to include provisions that heavily favor themselves. No-
tice requirements are such provisions, inasmuch as failure to comply relieves the
insurer of liability and compliance with the provision affords no additional pro-
tection to the insured, but simply maintains the existing policy coverage.
In jurisdictions that have abandoned the strict construction approach, prej-
udice against the insurer determines whether insurers remain liable when notice
does not comply with the policy provisions.21 Since the main purpose of a no-
tice requirement is to afford the insurer the opportunity to adequately investigate
and defend the claim, the test is whether the late notice in any way prejudices
the insurer's ability to do so. If not, there is no reason for the insurer to escape
liability. In most jurisdictions that have abandoned the strict construction ap-
proach, including North Carolina under the test set forth in Tate, the burden of
proof is on the insurer to show that it was prejudiced by the delay.22
Tate and all previous North Carolina cases involving insurance contract
notice provisions dealt with notice requirements in original insurance contracts.
Recently, however, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
North Carolina applied the test adopted in Tate to a reinsurance contract.23 In
Fortress Re, Inc. v. Central National Insurance Co.,24 the court held that the
insurer's excessive delay in notifying the reinsurer of the claim had prejudiced
the reinsurer. Therefore the reinsurer was relieved of its obligation to pay under
the contract.25 Fortress Re, the first case to apply the Tate test, extended the
scope of Tate from original insurance contracts to reinsurance contracts. In so
ruling, the court departed from previous federal court decisions, applying pre-
Tate North Carolina law, that had applied the strict construction approach to
reinsurance contracts. 26
Reinsurance, as distinguished from original insurance, is a means of risk
distribution whereby one insurer (the reinsured) contracts with another insurer
(the reinsurer) for indemnity from all or a portion of the risk underwritten by
the reinsured. 27 Even though reinsurance has been characterized as a separate
20. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Milam, 438 F. Supp. 227 (S.D.W.Va. 1977); Cooper
v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 51 N.J. 86, 237 A.2d 870 (1968); Brakeman v. Potomac Ins.
Co., 472 Pa. 66, 371 A.2d 193 (1977); see also Note, supra note 1, at 171 ("[A]lmost all of the
decisions [adopting a prejudice test] have been based on the adhesion contract rationale."). For a
general discussion of the rationale behind courts' adoption of the prejudice test, see Comment, supra
note 5, at 266-72.
21. See 8 J. APPLEMAN, supra note 1, § 4732, at 26-31; 13A G. COUCH, supra note 1, § 49:10,
at 234.
22. See Note, supra note 1, at 172-73.
23. For a discussion of the distinction between original insurance contracts and reinsurance
contracts, see infra notes § 27-30 and accompanying text.
24. 595 F. Supp. 334 (E.D.N.C. 1983).
25. Id. at 340.
26. See Fortress Re, Inc. v. Jefferson Ins. Co. of New York, 465 F. Supp. 333 (E.D.N.C. 1978),
aff'd, 628 F.2d 860 (4th Cir. 1980). "Generally the rules which govern the construction of contracts
and original policies of insurance are applicable to reinsurance contracts." Id. at 338 (quoting 13A
J. APPLEMAN, supra note 1, § 7686, at 500).
27. Shulman, Reinsurance: A Primer for the Practitioner, L.A. LAW, Oct. 1980 at 34; see also
13A J. APPLEMAN, supra note 1, § 7681, at 480; 19 G. COUCH, supra note 1, § 80:1, at 624,
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class of insurance, 28 contracts of reinsurance are governed by the same rules
applicable to other insurance contracts. 29 Thus, even though most cases con-
cerning notice requirements have involved original insurance policies, the same
rules and terms are used in cases concerning reinsurance contracts. 30
The controversy in Fortress Re arose out of a reinsurance contract executed
by the parties in 1975.31 In September 1978 the insurer was notified of a claim
filed against its insured, a swimming pool manufacturer, for injuries sustained by
an individual while diving into one of the insured's pools. 32 Because of the rein-
surer's obligation under the contract to reimburse the insurer in the event of
liability under the insurer's policy, it appeared likely that the claim would in-
volve the reinsurer. Shortly after receiving notification of the claim, the insurer
assigned the case to counsel. Upon investigation, counsel determined that "the
claim was a serious one and excess carriers should certainly be notified."' 33 In
April 1980 counsel again advised the insurer of the seriousness of the claim.34
On at least two occasions the insurer's internal memoranda indicated that it was
aware of the need to notify the reinsurers. 35 Throughout this period, the insurer
sought to reach a settlement agreement with the accident victim. 36
The insurer finally notified the reinsurer, Fortress Re, of the suit on January
6, 1982, over three years after the claim arose. 37 Trial was set for January 12,
which was only three working days following the initial notice. The insurer
invited Fortress Re to attend a conference with the trial defense counsel on the
eve of the trial. 38 Fortress Re did not attend this meeting, at which the claim
was settled for $923,605. 39 Fortress Re then instituted a declaratory judgment
action to obtain a declaration of its rights and obligations under the contract,
alleging that the insurer had breached the notice requirement,4° thereby absolv-
28. 19 G. COUCH, supra note 1, § 80:2, at 624.
29. 13A J. APPLEMAN, supra note 1, § 7686, at 500; 19 G. COUcH, supra note 1, § 80:1, at 623.
30. !Kg., Fortress Re, Inc. v. Jefferson Ins. Co. of New York, 465 F. Supp. 333 (E.D.N.C.
1978), aff'd, 628 F.2d 860 (4th Cir. 1980); Security Mut. Casualty Co. V. Century Casualty Co., 531
F.2d 974 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 860 (1976); Highlands Ins. Co. v. Employers Surplus
Lines Ins. Co., 497 F. Supp. 169 (E.D. La. 1980); Stuyvesant Ins. Co. v. United Public Ins. Co., 139
Ind. App. 533, 221 N.E.2d 358 (1966).
31. Under the contract, the reinsurer was to reinsure one-half of the insurer's liability over
$250,000 under a products liability insurance policy issued to a swimming pool manufacturer. The
upper limit of the liability policy was $1,000,000. Fortress Re, 595 F. Supp. at 336 & n.1.
32. Id. at 336.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Internal memoranda indicating an awareness of this need were dated November 1980 and
July 1981. The 1981 memorandum read, in part: "'They [the reinsurers] must be put on notice...
and get notice out to the facultative reinsurers.'" Id.
36. Id. at 337.
37. Id.
38. The correspondence extending the invitation read: "'Consider this your invitation to at-
tend [the trial]. We will be meeting with defense counsel.. . in New Jersey on Sunday evening
[January 11].'" Id. at 337 (quoting Letter from Central National Insurance Co. to Fortress Re, Inc.
(Jan. 6, 1982)).
39. Id. at 337.
40. The notice provision in the reinsurance contract read:
Prompt notice shall be given to the Reinsurer by the Company of any occurrence or
accident which appears likely to involve this reinsurance and while the Reinsurer does not
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ing the reinsurer of liability under the reinsurance contract.
After noting that North Carolina law applied to the case, 4 1 the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina turned to the
substantive issue raised-whether the reinsurer was relieved of liability because
of the reinsured's violation of the notice requirement. The court assumed with-
out discussion that Tate controlled the outcome of the case.42 Fortress Re, how-
ever, is distinguishable from Tate, which dealt with a notice requirement in an
original insurance contract. The considerations that led the court in Tate to
adopt the prejudice test do not apply with equal force to a reinsurance contract.
Prior federal cases interpreting North Carolina law that dealt with notice re-
quirements in reinsurance contracts had applied a rule of strict construction.
Even though courts in reinsurance cases generally apply rules applicable to in-
surance policies and other contracts, it is arguable that the Tate test should not
be applied in the reinsurance context. One of the principal bases for the court's
decision in Tate was the belief that the "terms of an insurance contract are not
bargained for in the traditional sense"; rather, they are "offered on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis" with the insured having little, if any, input.43 This same belief
pervades decisions in other jurisdictions adopting a prejudice test. 44 In cases
arising out of original insurance contracts, some courts see a necessity to protect
insureds from potentially unfair insurance contracts since insureds have no con-
trol over the terms of their contracts. Reinsurance contracts, however, typically
are negotiated by the parties.45 Thus, the need for protection of the insured does
not exist in a reinsurance context. The parties to the contract presumably are
aware of the law relating to insurance and reinsurance contracts, including the
importance of prompt notice. 46 Accordingly, it would be reasonable to apply a
stricter standard of compliance with the notice requirement to a reinsured than
to an insured under an original insurance contract.
47
undertake to investigate or defend claims or suits it shall nevertheless have the right and be
given the opportunity to associate with the Company and its representatives at the Rein-
surer's expense in the defense and control of any claim, suit or proceeding involving this
reinsurance, with the full cooperation of the Company.
Id. at 337 n.4.
41. Id. at 337.
42. Id. at 337-38.
43. Tate, 303 N.C. at 395, 279 S.E.2d at 774.
44. See, eg., Cooper v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 51 N.J. 86, 93, 237 A.2d 870, 873
(1968) ("[T]he terms of an insurance policy are not talked out or bargained for as in the case of
contracts generally."); Brakeman v. Potomac Ins. Co., 472 Pa. 66, 72, 371 A.2d 193, 196 (1977)
("An insurance contract is not a negotiated agreement; rather its conditions are by and large dictated
by the insurance company to the insured."); Pickering v. American Employers Ins. Co., 109 R.I.
143, 159, 282 A.2d 584, 593 (1971) ("An insurance contract is not the end result of the give-and-take
that goes on at a bargaining table."). The Tate court relied on all three of these cases. Tate, 303
N.C. at 394-95, 279 S.E.2d at 773-74.
45. See Shulman, supra note 27, at 35. For example, the contract in Fortress Re was negotiated
between the parties. Fortress Re, 595 F. Supp. at 336.
46. Because both parties are insurance companies, it is reasonable to expect them to have
knowledge of the law surrounding the interpretation of insurance contracts, including reinsurance
contracts.
47. This idea has been applied in cases and endorsed by commentators. See, e.g., Stuyvesant
Ins. Co. v. United Public Ins. Co., 139 Ind. App. 533, 543, 221 N.E.2d 358, 360 (1966) (compared to
individual insureds, insurance company held to a stricter standard of reasonable time to notify rein-
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The court correctly decided under the first part of the test that the rein-
sured in fact had failed to give prompt notice of the claim to the reinsurer.48
Under the second prong of the Tate test, the court held that the reinsured failed
to meet its burden of proof that it had acted in good faith in giving notice at such
a late date. The reinsured contended that good faith may be shown by an "ab-
sence of motive or specific intent not to notify the insurer." 4 9 The court rejected
this contention, concluding that "[a] bad motive or specific intent is not re-
quired" for a showing of bad faith.50 The court noted that even though the
reinsured was aware of the necessity for notifying the reinsurers, it failed to do
so until just before trial. The court also held that the delinquency of notice had
prejudiced the reinsurer in its "ability to participate in the defense and control of
the claim and its evaluation for settlement purposes." 51 The reinsured's conduct
was "so lacking in reasonableness and fair dealing that it amount[ed] to a lack of
good faith as a matter of law."'52 The court therefore granted the reinsurer's
motion for summary judgment.53
The court was justified in reaching this conclusion. Under North Carolina
law each party to a contract is "required to act in good faith and to make rea-
sonable efforts to perform his obligations under the agreement."' 54 This princi-
ple has been applied to contracts between business entities as well as to contracts
between individuals.5 5 It also has been held that good faith means more than an
honest intention to act fairly; it includes an absence of knowledge of any infor-
mation that would cause the action to be unfair.56 Thus, as the court in Fortress
Re concluded, "where two business entities deal at arms length, unreasonable or
unfair dealings can amount to a lack of good faith." 57
surer of claim of loss due to its superior knowledge); 19 G. CoucH, supra note 1, § 80:71, at 681
("Being an insurance company, the reinsured is held to a high degree of compliance with policy
provisions which require prompt notice to the reinsurer when a loss occurs which may potentially be
within policy coverage.").
48. The reinsured "waited for over three years before notifying the [reinsurer] and then [gave
notice] only on the eve of trial," even though it was aware shortly, after it received notice of the claim
that the reinsurance was likely to be involved. The reinsured also was advised by counsel to notify
the reinsurers well in advance of the time it actually gave notification. Fortress Re, 595 F. Supp. at
338. Internal memoranda reflected the reinsured's acknowledgement of its duty to give notification.
Id.; see also supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
49. Fortress Re, 595 F. Supp. at 338.
50. Id. The court noted that the court in Tate had cited lack of knowledge that a claim had
been filed as an example of good faith. Tate, 303 N.C. at 339, 279 S.E.2d at 776. Since in Fortress
Re the reinsurer was aware of the claim for over three years before it gave notice, the court in
Fortress Re must have concluded from the Tate example that actual notice of a claim followed by a
delay in notifying the insurer/reinsurer amounted to a lack of good faith.
51. Fortress Re, 595 F. Supp. at 339.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 336.
54. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Godwin Bldg. Supply Co., Inc., 40 N.C. App. 743, 746, 253 S.E.2d
625, 627 (1979); see also United Roasters, Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 649 F.2d 985, 990 (4th Cir.
1981) ("North Carolina law does require that parties perform their contractual obligations in good
faith.").
55. See, eg., United Roasters, Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 485 F. Supp. 1049 (E.D.N.C.
1980), aff'd, 649 F.2d 985, 989-90 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1054 (1981); Weyerhaeuser Co.
v. Godwin Bldg. Supply Co., 40 N.C. App. 743, 746, 253 S.E.2d 625, 627-28 (1979).
56. See Jaudon v. Swink, 51 N.C. App. 433, 435, 276 S.E.2d 511, 513 (1981).
57. Fortress Re, 595 F. Supp. at 339.
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The principal issue raised by Fortress Re is the application of the prejudice
component of the Tate test to a delayed notice situation involving a reinsurance
contract. Using the Tate test, the court in Fortress Re found that the reinsured
acted in bad faith; and as a result, the reinsurer was relieved of its obligations
under the contract. There was, therefore, no need to discuss prejudice since
under the Tate test it is only when the good faith test is met that the issue of
prejudice even arises. 8 Nevertheless, the court in Fortress Re addressed the
prejudice issue. Noting the distinction between insurance and reinsurance, the
court looked to the purpose of the notice requirement in a reinsurance contract
to determine whether the reinsurer had been prejudiced by delayed notice. The
court decided that the underlying purpose of notice requirements in both insur-
ance and reinsurance contracts is to protect the bargain of the parties.5 9 It then
defined prejudice as "the irretrievable loss of the bargain." 6 Prejudice occurred
in Fortress Re when the reinsured lost what it had bargained for-"the ability to
participate in the defense and control of the claim and its evaluation for settle-
ment purposes." 6 1 Because the reinsurer was given notice only three working
days before trial, the purpose of the notice requirement was frustrated. Thus,
the court held as a matter of law that the reinsurer had been prejudiced by the
reinsured's tardy notice.62
The Tate test places the burden to prove prejudice on the insurer.63 The
Tate court apparently intended the prejudice issue to be a question of fact, de-
cided on a case-by-case basis.64 Thus, it is curious that the court in Fortress Re
held that the reinsurer was prejudiced as a matter of law. The court candidly
recognized the lack of case law in North Carolina interpreting the prejudice
requirement.65 Without case law to develop a standard of prejudice, it seems
anomalous that a court would find prejudice as a matter of law in any situation.
The facts in Fortress Re justify the court's holding; the reinsured substan-
tially delayed giving notice to the reinsurer. If, however, a case with a less com-
pelling fact situation arises, the application of the Tate test could thwart the
intention of the parties, who are aware of their duties and who often have negoti-
ated their contract. Therefore, a modified version of the Tate test should be
applied in reinsurance cases. Courts should hold the reinsured to a high stan-
dard of good faith and require only a low degree of prejudice to the reinsurer.
58. Tate, 303 N.C. at 399, 279 S.E.2d at 776.
59. Although it noted that the Tate court discussed prejudice in terms of the insurer's ability to
defend the lawsuit, the Fortress Re court nevertheless declared that prejudice as defined in Tate did
not apply in the reinsurance context. The Tate approach was intended "to protect the bargain of the
parties." Fortress Re, 595 F. Supp. at 339. The court reasoned that the reinsurer had bargained for




62. Id. at 340.
63. Tate, 303 N.C. at 397-99, 279 S.E.2d at 775-76.
64. "Circumstances which may cause prejudice to an insurer are as varied and as numerous as
the circumstances surrounding automobile accidents. A more complete discussion of prejudicial
factors will have to await a case-by-case development." Id. at 399, 279 S.E.2d 776.
65. Fortress Re, 595 F. Supp. at 339.
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Such a test would emphasize the obligation of the reinsured to perform its duty
of prompt notice under a bargained-for reinsurance contract, while retaining the
notion of prejudice in the event that the reinsured shows a legitimate justification
for the delayed notice. Good faith under this test should be limited to situations
in which the reinsured lacks actual knowledge of a claim and lacks any informa-
tion that should give rise to knowledge of the claim and to situations in which
delay is caused by factors beyond the reinsured's control. Even if the good faith
test is met, however, the burden on the reinsurer of showing prejudice should be
light. A reasonable showing that timely notice might have made a difference in
the ultimate liability of the reinsurer should be enough to show prejudice.
The court in Fortress Re followed a recent innovation in North Carolina
original insurance law and applied it in a different context-reinsurance law.
The reinsurer in Fortress Re was relieved of liability because of a bad faith delay
in notice to the reinsurer and the prejudice that resulted. The application of the
Tate test to the facts of Fortress Re resulted in a correct decision that upheld the
intention of the parties. It remains to be seen whether this same test can con-
tinue to uphold the intention of parties in future reinsurance actions. Since no
North Carolina cases have addressed the issue of notice requirements in reinsur-
ance contracts, it is not possible to determine whether North Carolina courts
will follow the rationale of the federal district court in Fortress Re. North Caro-
lina courts should not strictly apply the Tate test to notice provisions of reinsur-
ance contracts. Instead, they should adopt a modified version of the Tate test, as
described in this Note. Such a test would protect the reasonable expectations of
both parties to a reinsurance contract.
CARLTON A. SHANNON, JR.
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